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IMPORTANT TERMS FOR INCLUSION IN
CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS FOR
FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPANIES
Bryan D. Boltont
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

In a fast-paced financial world, it is easy to understand how
parties agree on a settlement figure, assume the final documents
resolving the matter are worth only perfunctory consideration, and
press on to the next matter. This attitude is all the more
understandable in the context of the pressures on in-house counsel
to keep costs down, and on outside counsel to keep billing for
collectable time.
These pressures, among others, create
opportunities for error in the context of what many refer to as a
"standard" release.
This article questions the wisdom of approaching a rapidly
changing financial services world armed with nothing more than a
traditional standard release. Indeed, this is no trivial matter
because the majority of disputes are resolved through settlement. I
Moreover, a traditional standard release may be ill-suited to the
types of forward-looking financial instruments, products, and
services offered by financial services companies.
If a standard release does not clearly and unequivocally
terminate the parties' future rights and obligations, is it reasonable
to expect courts to interpret that agreement as intending
consequences not expressed in the writing? Is it reasonable to
expect courts to forbid parol evidence concerning the intent of the
claimant, when the financial services company must offer its own
parol evidence to establish intent? The premise of this article is
that careful counsel, inside or outside, should look beyond standard
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David M. Trubeck et a!., The Cost of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72,
86-87 (1983) (almost ninety percent of lawsuits are settled or abandoned without
filing a claim).
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or traditional release provisions in order to ensure that financial
services companies receive the benefit of their settlement bargain.
An essential component of this process requires appreciation of
the fundamental difference between a standard release employed in
tort cases and a release needed by a financial services company
offering financial products looking years, if not decades, into the
future. Although cataloging the myriad of financial instruments
and products available in the marketplace is beyond the scope of
this article, suffice it to say that annuities, fixed and variable;
whole life, universal life, and variable life insurance policies; and
various retirement accounts, including IRAs, 401Ks, and pension
plans, are but a few examples. In contrast to these forward-looking
financial instruments and products, most tort actions only concern
events occurring in the past, e.g., an automobile accident or an
incident of alleged medical malpractice. This difference in
perspective, prospective versus retrospective, may not appear
significant, but the differences are real and meaningful.
Second, a significant reason for the difference between
prospective financial instruments and retrospective tort claims is
based on differences in judicial application of the legal doctrine of
res judicata. Although a dismissal with prejudice in an automobile
tort claim may extinguish all claims, including potential claims by
a party,2 it is not equally true that a dismissal with prejudice will
resolve the future rights of an annuitant to receive or transfer future
annuity benefits or both.3 Rather, the future relations, if any,
between the annuitant and the financial services company most
likely will be governed by contract, meaning the settlement
agreement and release executed by the parties that led to the
dismissal of the pending action. 4
Third, financial services companies cannot realistically expect
courts to assume responsibility for protecting large, sophisticated
financial services institutions if they fail or neglect to protect their
own rights through the express terms of a settlement agreement.
Moreover, if the financial services company is compelled to offer
2.

3.
4.

See Samuels v. N. Telecom, Inc., 942 F.2d 834, 836 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[A]
dismissal with prejudice has the effect of a final adjUdication on the merits
favorable to the defendant and bars future suits brought by plaintiff upon the
same cause of action." (quoting Nemaizer v. Baker. 793 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir.
1986»); Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc., 924 F.2d 530, 534 (4th
Cir. 1991) ("A voluntary dismissal with prejudice ... is a complete adjudication
on the merits of the dismissed claim."); Schwarz v. Folloder. 767 F.2d 125, 130
(5th Cir. 1985) ("[A] dismissal with prejudice gives the defendant the full relief
to which he is legally entitled and is tantamount to a judgment on the merits.").
See Patrowicz v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 140, 156 (D.
Conn. 2005) (finding some claims left unresolved by dismissal of a prior action).
See Calabi v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 353 Md. 649, 653, 728 A.2d 206, 208
(1999) (treating settlement agreements no different than binding contracts).
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parol evidence to support its position, then a court is likely to find
the agreement ambiguous as written and construe it against the
financial services company.s Moreover, if the financial services
company is forced to offer parol evidence of its broad intent at the
time of settlement, then the court is equally likely to accept a
claimant's testimony of the opposite intent. 6 This leaves courts
free to reason that, if a large financial services company failed to
fully and adequately address its future obligations in its settlement
agreement, then how can it penalize the consumer by permitting a
discharge of those prospective obligations. 7
Understanding this background is essential to permanently
resolving prospective claims against financial services companies.
Moreover, by recognizing the differences, it is easy to understand
how a standard release that may be routinely and effectively
employed to resolve tort claims is likely to be woefully insufficient
to protect a financial services company in connection with the
settlement of a forward-looking financial product.
This article highlights important considerations and issues that a
financial services company or a lawyer representing a financial
services company should consider before executing a settlement
agreement and release. Notably, as outlined in greater detail
below, this author submits the better practice is to enter into a
settlement agreement and release as a fully integrated document.
Although this article docs not purport to dictate specific language
for inclusion in a settlement agreement and release, which may
vary from state to state based on historical considerations, it
provides the reader with sample language and highlights points for
consideration and inclusion in a settlement agreement and release
involving a financial services company.
1.

Recite and Acknowledge Receipt of the Consideration in the
Agreement

Although mutual promises may be sufficient consideration for a
rclease, 8 the better practice is to include the amount paid in
5.

6.

7.

8.

See Wolfgang v. Mid-Am. Motorsports, Inc., 111 F.3d 1515, 1524-25 (lOth CiT.
1997) (applying general contract interpretation rules); Pekar v. Local Union No.
181 of the Int'l Union of United Brewery, 311 F.2d 628, 636 (6th CiT. 1962)
(stating that when an agreement is ambiguous, the court will interpret the
language with the uniform past practice of the parties).
See Van Koevering v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., 234 F. Supp. 786, 790-91 (W.D. Mich.
1964) (under the parol evidence rule, the court admitted extrinsic evidence of the
plaintiff's intent and ultimately ruled in favor of the plaintiff).
Cf Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076
(1984) (arguing that the bargaining process disparity between plaintiffs and
financial services companies is "at odds with a conception of justice").
E.g., City Nat'l Bank of Fort Smith v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Rogers,
732 SW.2d 489, 493 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987).
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settlement and to acknowledge receipt of that consideration in the
settlement agreement. By including the specific amount of
consideration paid in the settlement agreement, the financial
services company largely moots any question as to the adequacy of
the consideration. 9
The argument against including the amount paid in settlement
generally is expressed in terms of a desire to keep the price of
peace outside the public domain. lO The counter-points, however,
are that this information will become public anyway because (I)
the agreement may not be confidential; (2) the financial services
company may be required to disclose it in financial or regulatory
filings; and (3) the claimant may disclose it in an action to set aside
the agreement because the consideration was too low. Although
this last point may be disquieting, the disclosure under such
circumstances generally should not prove harmful to a financial
services company.ll
Additional reasons exist for including the amount of
consideration paid in the settlement agreement. First, as the world
moves increasingly toward electronic transactions, including wire
transfers, locating the documentation necessary to verify settlement
payments made years in the past will be difficult. If an agreement
was reached ten years ago concerning termination of an annuity,
and the allegation was made today that the consideration was never
paid, then imagine the difficulty in locating a copy of the canceled
check to prove the consideration was paid.
Second, if the financial services company is obligated to offer
evidence outside the four comers of the settlement agreement and
release in support of its motion for summary disposition, then the
other side is better positioned to argue that it likewise can offer
extrinsic rebuttal evidence. 12 A financial services company wants
to present a case for summary disposition, not suggest through its
own evidence that discovery and an evidentiary hearing are
By including all relevant terms in the settlement
necessary. 13
agreement and release, including the consideration paid and an
acknowledgement of receipt of good and valuable consideration,
9.

10.
It.
12.

13.

See George R. Hall, Inc. v. Superior Trucking Co., 532 F.Supp. 985,992 (D. Ga.
1982) (explaining that "ordinarily courts will not examine the adequacy of
consideration" as long as some consideration exists).
John Gilbeaut, Secret Justice, 84 A.B.A. J. 50, 50, 53 (1998).
See Cleere v. United Parcel Serv., 669 P.2d 785, 790 (Okla. Civ. App. 1983)
(stating that disclosure ofthe amount of consideration paid is a rare occurrence).
See Outland v. Heritage Custom Constr., 2002-0hio-6595, at m139-40 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2002) (holding it was error to allow one side, but not the other, to introduce
parol evidence).
Cf Hensley v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 277 F.3d 535, 540-41 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding
that in order to enforce a settlement agreement, the parties must prove that the
settlement is a complete agreement and that the terms and conditions are clear).
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the financial services company increases the chances that a simple
motion has a substantial chance of disposing of the entire matter.

2.

The Preamble Should Be Part of the Agreement

After reciting the names of the settling parties, it is common to
see a brief synopsis of the facts and circumstances leading to the
settlement. Many parties fail to realize, however, that the
preamble may not be part ofthe agreement. 14 Although this is not
a problem if the draftsperson appreciates this point, it can become
a problem. If, for example, the denial of liability appears in the
preamble, but not in the agreement, then is liability still in dispute
after the agreement is signed? This could raise difficult questions
about whether the settlement agreement might be relevant and
discoverable in a future action based on the contention that the
company admitted liability. IS A simple solution to this problem is
to incorporate the preamble into the agreement. Drafters of these
settlements should consider adding language stating that the
preamble is an integral part of, and forms a basis for, the parties'
agreement. This should avoid any future contention that the
preamble was unimportant, not integral, and not part of the
settlement agreement.

3.

The Needfor a Broad Release of Claims

Standard release language often exculpates a party from any
liability to the other up through and including the date of the
agreement, and with regard to the claims stated, or that could have
been stated, in a specific lawsuit. 16 The impact of this standard
language on the cash value in a whole life insurance policy may be
unclear at best, and the parties' rights and obligations may be
equally unclear. In fact, if the release only purports to release
rights through the date of the settlement, then it is debatable
whether future accruing rights and obligations were intended to
constitute a part of the agreement.
The careful practitioner should consider crafting the release to
cover not only past, but also future benefits, rights, and obligations
that the parties intend to resolve through the release. If, for
example, the intent is to have the releasing party release all right,
14.

IS.

16.

See Fassler v. Okemo Mountain, Inc., 536 A.2d 930, 933 (Vt. 1987) (quoting
Vinyard v. St. Louis County, 399 S.W.2d 99, 106 (Mo. 1966)); Trs. of
Canandarqua Acad. v. McKechnie, 90 N.Y. 618,626 (1882).
See Doe v. Methacton Sch. Dis!., 164 FRD. 175, 176-77 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(finding that a confidential settlement agreement is not discoverable if it is not
relevant).
E.g., First Trust Corp. v. Edwards, 172 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2005); Venus
Drywall, Inc. v. Kullman Indus., No. 93-2616E, 1996 Mass. Super. LEXIS 596,
at *7-8 (Mar. 22,1996), aird, 693 N.E.2d 1066 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
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title, and interest in the cash value of a whole life insurance policy,
then include specific language addressing this point in the release
provIsIOn. Similarly, if the intent is that the claimant will
relinquish all rights to future annuity, disability, and pension plan
benefits, then include language specifically releasing those rights
in the release.
Although language extending the release to "heirs, successors,
and assigns" may seem common, this language is absolutely
essential for a financial services company. Indeed, this language
may serve as a bar to claims asserted for the first time after the
death of the claimant. 17 A financial services company should not
count on the courts to broadly construe a settlement agreement that
is not broadly written and that does not explicitly or by necessary
implication clearly contemplate the release of the asserted claim. 18

4.

Advice of Counsel Provision Is Important

Although the law encourages the settlement of disputes and
generally presumes a release is valid,19 the key for a financial
services company is making certain that resolved matters stay
resolved. A provision essential to keeping matters resolved is one
providing that the settlement agreement was executed with the
benefit of, and on the advice of, independent counse1. 20
If a settlement agreement and release is challenged based on
allegations that it was "obtained by fraud, deception,
misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence,,,21 then the advice of
counsel provision, coupled with the integration clause, may be
important tools for the defense. Assuming a challenge is made
based on fraud or other similar grounds, then the inclusion in the
settlement agreement and release of a provision expressly reciting
that the document was executed with the benefit of and on the
advice of independent counsel will be important. 22
Absent the most egregious circumstances, it is hard to imagine a
lawyer alleging he or she was duped into settling on unfavorable

17.

18.

19.
20.
21.
22.

See, e.g., Kelley v. Burnsed, 805 So. 2d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 2002) (holding that
heirs and assigns were bound by contract after death of the original contracting
party).
See Bernstein v. Kapneck, 290 Md. 452, 459,430 A.2d 602, 606 (1981) (stating
that words used to express the breadth of a contract should be given their
ordinary meaning).
Schmitt-Norton Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 524 F. Supp. 1099, 1102 (D. Minn.
1981).
Jd.
Bennett v. Coors Brewing Co., 189 F.3d 1221, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999); Skrbina v.
Fleming Co., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 481,489 (1996).
Fonseca v. Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., 37 F. Supp. 2d 214, 229 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
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terms. 23
At most, a lawyer claiming to be duped could
ineffectively allege he or she was unaware of material facts at the
time of settlement. Absent fraud, an essentially unilateral mistake
of settling on unfavorable terms generally is not grounds for setting
aside a settlement agreement. 24
Assuming counsel alleged a lack of full knowledge of the
material facts, it is hard to imagine a court holding that opposing
counsel had some affirmative duty of disclosure to an adversary in
litigation. 25 Moreover, settlement discussions frequently involve
what is referred to as "puffery,,,26 which is a far cry from fraud.
Indeed, relatively few settlements are achieved without both
sides engaging in some degree of puffery as to the quality of their
evidence, witnesses, trial skills, prospects at trial, and rulings on
dispositive motions and motions in limine.27 Puffery between
counsel in the course of the settlement negotiations will rarely, if
ever, rise to the level of actionable fraud. 28 This is particularly true
when the agreement makes clear that the parties each had separate
and independent counsel and advice at the time they entered into
the agreement.
The provision regarding the advice of separate and independent
counsel also may be important in determining whether the
purported reliance was reasonable. 29 The point could be argued
that the attorneys were posturing, or puffing, to each other, both
were experienced counsel, and both understood what they were
doing. Since each side had independent counsel of their own

23.

24.
25.

26.

27.

28.
29.

See Creamer v. Helferstay, 294 Md. 107, 121, 125,448 A.2d 332, 333-35, 341
(1982) (summarizing the circumstances that did not rise to the level of
"intentional, culpable conduct" necessary to set aside a settlement agreement).
ld. at 120-26,448 A.2d at 339-42.
See Spiegel v. Cont'! III. Nat'l Bank, 609 F. Supp. 1083, 1088 n.ll (N.D. III.
1985), ajf'd, 790 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding no duty to disclose in context
of adversariallitigation).
E.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976,
981 (6th Cir. 2003); Williams v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc., No. 94-2087, 1995
U.S. App. LEXIS 9830, at *2-3 (4th Cir. May 1, 1995); Promotion in Motion,
Inc. v. Kenny's Candy Co., No. 97-3512, 1999 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 22174, at *10
(D.N.J. Nov. 29,1999).
See, e.g., Addo v. Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co., 230 F.3d 759, 763-74 (5th Cir.
2000) (Wiener, 1., dissenting) (describing the document as "a 'sham' of a
settlement counteroffer," and as "puffery and posturing"); Gwyn v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 44, 46 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (stating that the natural
tendency is for counsel to inflate a claim's value is puffery).
See, e.g., Turf Lawnmower Repair v. Bergen Record Corp., 655 A.2d 417, 430
(N.J. 1995) (considering puffery in consumer context).
See Felix v. Lucent Teehs., Inc., 387 F.3d 1146, 1164-65 (lOth Cir. 2004)
(quoting Silver v. Slusher, 770 P.2d 878, 881 n.8 (Okla. 1989» (reasonable
reliance on misrepresentations is required to prove fraud).
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choosing, the claim of "reasonable" reliance on opposing counsel
is inherently unreasonable. 3o

5.

Integration and Advice of Counsel- Better Together

No settlement agreement is complete without an integration
clause. Indeed, an integration clause, coupled with an advice of
counsel clause, is a powerful combination against any attempt to
set aside the settlement agreement based on fraud, duress, or undue
influence. 3 ! A typical integration clause might read as follows:
Integration Clause. This Agreement constitutes
the entire Agreement between the parties, and no
representations, agreements, or understandings of
any kind, either written or oral, shall be binding
upon the parties unless expressly contained herein.
This Agreement is a complete and exhaustive
statement of the terms of the parties' agreement,
which may not be explained or supplemented by
evidence of consistent additional terms or
contradicted by evidence of any pnor or
contemporaneous agreement. No modification of
this Agreement shall be effective unless it is III
writing and signed by each of the parties?2
In addition to helping defeat any misrepresentation claims, this
provision should bar any party from (1) offering extrinsic evidence
to interpret the terms of a fully integrated unambiguous agreement;
(2) claiming the agreement was not what the parties intended; and
(3) claiming the a¥:reement was modified, amended, or rescinded
by oral agreement.· 3
Another important aspect of the integration clause pertains to
what is generally referred to as the parol evidence rule. 34 The
parol evidence rule generally bars oral testimony about antecedent
or contemporaneous conversations, negotiations, agreements, or
30.

31.

32.
33.
34.

See Finn v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 821 F.2d 581, 586 (11th Cir. 1987)
(finding that because of the adversarial relationship, the parties had no right to
rely on any of the opposing parties representations).
See Vigortone AG Prods., Inc. v. AG Prods., Inc., 316 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir.
2002) (explaining that with the parol evidence rule, an integration clause prevents
a party from relying on agreements made during negotiations which were not
contained in the actual contract); Bennett v. Coors Brewing Co., 189 F.3d 1221,
1231 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that, notwithstanding threats, a transaction
generally is not induced by duress where a party was advised by counsel).
Nigrelli v. Catholic Bishop, No. 94-2528, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 28271, at *2
(7th CiT. Oct. II, 1995).
See also id. (holding that a party cannot avoid or disregard a mutual contract
because it is less profitable than anticipated).
Vigorrone, 316 F.3d at 644 (citing Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603,
608 (7th Cir. 1993».
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understandings between the contracting parties, if offered to vary
or contradict the tenns of a fully integrated contract. 35 The parol
evidence rule, in fact, is a matter of substantive state law, not a rule
of evidence. 36 This point may be particularly noteworthy in tenns
of what law will apply to the agreement and whether an action is
filed in state or federal court. 37 A federal court sitting in diversity
jurisdiction will look to the relevant state law to detennine the
applicability of the parol evidence rule. 38
The parol evidence rule, not surprisingly, has exceptions. If an
agreement "appears to incompletely express the parties'
agreement," then the court may pennit the introduction of extrinsic
evidence. 39 An example of this exception is an agreement
referring to an attached exhibit A that never, in fact, was attached
to the agreement. 40 The court may pennit parol evidence to
establish what exhibit A was supposed to be. If the court finds the
agreement ambiguous, then extrinsic evidence may be allowed to
resolve any ambiguity.41
An additional benefit of the integration clause is that it carries
great wei§ht that the final agreement is exactly what the parties
intended. 4 The inclusion of an integration clause reduces the
chances that the court will find the agreement ambiguous.
Whether an integration clause will be considered sufficient to
bar a later claim for fraudulent inducement may depend on whether
the language in the integration clause is broad enough to cover the
representations fonning the basis for the fraud claim. 43 The
language quoted above is the type of language found sufficient to
bar a releasor's claim of fraudulent inducement. Indeed, this
language expressly disclaims the existence of any representations
upon which plaintiff could rely and further suggests that any
alleged reliance on such representations would be unfounded.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

40.
41.
42.
43.

Posey v. Ford Motor Credit Co., III P.3d 162, 165 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005).
Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Bogdahn, 89 P.3d 1051, 1060 & n.15 (Okla. 2004), aff'd,
No. 02-6172, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3699 (10th Cir. Feb. 26, 2004).
See, e.g., Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 749-50 (7th Cir.
1988) (case brought in federal court but state law applied).
See Vigortone, 316 F.3d at 642-44 (looking to Illinois law).
See Wolt v. Sherwood, 828 F. Supp. 1562, 1565-66 (D. Utah 1993) (quoting
Palmer v. Davis, 808 P.2d 128, 132 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (stating that the release
did "not contain an integration clause to indicate that its [sic] sets forth all of the
terms of the settlement"».
Old First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Scheuman, 13 N.E.2d 551, 558-59 (Ind.
1938).
Walt, 828 F. Supp. at 1565 (quoting Palmer, 808 P.2d at 132).
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63,75 n.6 (1977).
Cf Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 7 F.3d 310, 316 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding
support for the proposition that "the mere general recitation that a guarantee is
'absolute and unconditional' is insufficient ... to bar a defense of fraudulent
inducement").
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Thus, the claimant may be unable to prove two of the elements of a
typical fraud claim: misrepresentation and reasonable reliance.
Although the parol evidence rule may serve some of the same
purposes as an integration clause, they are not redundant. Given
the exceptions to the parol evidence rule, the strong desire to avoid
relitigation of settled issues, and the inability to anticipate all
possible future court actions, all possible future forums, and all
possible future legal theories, including an integration clause and a
favorable choice of law provision will increase the chances of
prevailing in or averting any subsequent challenge to the validity
of the settlement agreement and release.

6.

Ownership of Claims and the Financial Instrument

A well-drafted settlement agreement should include a provision
confirming the claimant's ownership of the claims alleged and
released in the settlement agreement. In the context of forwardlooking financial instruments, however, the settlement agreement
should go one step further and include a representation and
warranty that the releasing party is the owner of the pertinent
financial instrument. The careful practitioner should also take care
to confirm that the releasing party is, in fact, what he or she
purports to be-the owner of the relevant financial instrument. If
more than one owner is identified, or if more than one person may
have an ownership interest, for example co-trustees, then all
potential parties must verify ownership and sign the settlement
agreement and release. Although a trustee may be authorized to
sign the settlement agreement, from a practical perspective a
financial services company is not interested in litigating this issue
and should not be exposed to this risk. The better practice is to
ensure that the proper parties all sign and verify ownership of both
the claims and the financial instrument.

7.

The Importance of Surrender, Return, Cancellation, and
Relinquishment ofAll Rights Under the Financial Instrument

Regardless of whether the financial instrument is a life
insurance policy, annuity, stock, investment account, or some other
vehicle, it is critical that the financial services company obtain the
benefits of its bargain. If this means the insurance policy, annuity,
or stock owned by the releasing party is to have no further value,
then the prudent practitioner should insist on provisions in the
settlement agreement and release (1) obligating the releasing party
to surrender the original policy, annuity, stock certificate, or other
like documents; and (2) confirming that the policy, annuity, stock,
or other like documents are canceled; all rights and obligations
incident thereto are void and of no further force and effect; and all
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rights, duties, and obligations are extinguished as of the date of the
settlement agreement and release.
The settlement agreement should specifically provide that the
parties agree the releasing party shall have no right to receive any
past, present, or future rights or benefits of any kind or nature
under the specific instrument.
Conversely, the settlement
agreement should provide that the financial services company has
no further obligations of any kind or nature, either past, present, or
future, under the financial instrument.
If the financial instrument could be returned to the company,
then the prudent practitioner should require the formal surrender of
the original and all copies of the policy, annuity, or bond. If the
financial instrument could be returned to the company but the
claimant is unable to locate it, then the prudent practitioner should
consider asking for a representation and warranty that the
document cannot be located and, if it is located, will be destroyed
immediately and cannot be returned to the financial services
company for any reason. A related provision stating that the
policy, annuity, or bond is canceled and of no further force, effect,
or value of any kind or nature, even if located in the future, should
also be included.
The language outlined above, in conjunction with a broad
release, should avoid situations where the releasing party claims
the right to receive cash value in a whole life policy, death
benefits, disability benefits, or future annuity payments. Indeed,
even if the releasing party is unquestionably trustworthy, his or her
descendants may not be; this provision will help guard against such
prospective claims.

8.

Confidentiality Clause -Its Necessity and Extent of Inclusion

Although most financial services companies prefer settlement
agreements to include confidentiality clauses, this is an
increasingly contentious issue.
From the financial services
company's perspective, the benefits are obvious. The financial
services company wants to avoid adverse publicity, which may
tarnish the reputation of the company and precipitate additional
claims. Although some releasing parties may not wish to keep a
settlement agreement confidential, if the releasing party makes
clear from the beginning that confidentiality is a part of the
agreement, then obtaining this type of provision is often easier than
it would be if the issue is not broached until late in the drafting
process.
Two related points about confidentiality are worth mentioning.
As a threshold matter, consider including a statement in the
settlement agreement that both parties agree is not a violation of
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the confidentiality agreement. The parties could agree that they
may disclose only the following: "Plaintiff and ABC Worldwide
Financial Services agree to resolve this matter upon mutually
acceptable terms without either admitting liability."
If a confidentiality provision permits disclosure in response to a
court order or for good cause, then this may expose the
confidential settlement agreement to discovery in subsequent
actions involving different parties.44 Although the majority view is
that courts should encourage settlements by employing a
heightened standard of review before ordering production of a
confidential settlement agreement,45 other courts have found no
additional scrutiny is necessary or appropriate. 46
A secondary consideration is whether to seek to impose
stipulated consequences for a breach of the confidentiality
provision. A provision stipulating to liquidated damages equal to
fifty percent of the settlement amount if plaintiff breaches the
confidentiality provision may be particularly appropriate if
confidentiality is a critical component of the settlement agreement.
If a liquidated damages provision is included, then care should be
given to setting the right amount. In Maryland, for example,
liquidated damages cannot be penal and must fairly approximate
the damages likely to be suffered by the non-breaching party.47
Moreover, it should be noted that, if the court orders disclosure of
the confidential terms of a settlement agreement, then the court
may not enforce the liquidated damages provision in the
confidential settlement agreement. 48
The question of the effectiveness of the confidentiality clause
also may tum on such mundane variables as whether the second
action seeking the discovery is pending in federal or state court. In
a federal court action in Florida, the court denied a sex
discrimination plaintiffs request to discover confidential
settlement agreements in other sex discrimination cases against the
employer absent a showing that the information was relevant. 49
Contrast this with a state court action in Florida, where plaintiffs
sought to depose a plaintiff from an earlier case that had resulted in
a settlement agreement including a confidentiality clause
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Brant v. CCG Fin. Corp., No. 87-655, 1989 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 15269, at *4, 8-9
(D. Or. Dec. 14, 1989).
Young v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 169 F.R.D. 72, 79 (S.D. W. Va. 1996).
Griffin v. Mashariki, No. 96-6400, 1997 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 19325, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1997).
United Cable Television of Balt. Ltd. P'ship v. Burch, 354 Md. 658, 668, 732
A.2d 887, 892 (1999).
Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 367 (D. Nev. 1993).
Walker v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 286 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir.
2002).

2006]

Important Terms in Confidential Settlements

359

prohibiting responding '''in any way to any inquiry of any kind
whatsoever with regard to the facts surrounding the case/claim. ,,,50
The common defendant sought a protective order to prevent the
deposition from taking place. 51 The trial court ordered that the
earlier plaintiff could testify to "factual matters concerning the
52
allegations" in the earlier lawsuit but not to procedural aspects.
On appeal, the order was affirmed based on (1) the trial court's
broad discretion in handling discovery; (2) the public policy
considerations encouraging settlements are less important than the
suppression of evidence; and (3) the relevance of the evidence
sought. 53 Contrast this with a case where the settlement agreement
contained a strict confidentiality clause that had no excegtion for
The
disclosure pursuant to a court order or judicial process. 4
court upheld the magistrate judge's decision to grant a full
protective order precluding disclosure of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the settlement agreement. 55
The Georgia Court of Appeals has taken yet another position,
holding that there is an implied term in any confidentiality clause
in a settlement agreement that a party can "testify or otherwise
comply with a subpoena, court order, or applicable law.,,56 Tn
Barger v. Garden Way, Inc., the plaintiff injured his hand in a
wood chipper and sued the manufacturer. 57 He sought details of
other persons injured by the same product and disclosure of any
relevant information purportedly subject to confidentiality
agreements. 58 The defendant opposed this request, contending the
trial court had no authority to make the defendant surrender freely
bargained-for rights. 59 The trial court accepted this position, but
was subsequently overturned and defendant was required to answer
the discovery.6o Significantly, however, the precise language of
the relevant confidentiality clause was never provided to the
court. 61
These cases demonstrate the need for careful consideration of
the language to be included in a confidentiality clause. Although
there is no "one size fits all" solution, careful consideration of the
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Scott v. Nelson, 697 So. 2d 1300, 1300 (Fla. Dis!. Ct. App. 1997).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1301.
Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Hous. Servs., Inc., 190 F.R.D. 42, 43 (N.D.N.Y.
1999).
Id. at 44-45.
Barger v. Garden Way, Inc., 499 S.E.2d 737,741 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 739-40.
Id. at 740.
Id.
Id. at 740-41.
Id. at 740.
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benefits and burdens of various confidentiality provIsIons is
appropriate and the provisions should be tailored to the needs of
the specific financial services company.
9.

Deny Liability

By including a paragraph specifically denying liability for the
claims asserted and stating that the settlement agreement is
intended to resolve disputed claims, the party paying the
consideration is accomplishing two goals. First, the paying party is
not conceding the existence of grounds for imposing liability,
which could have important consequences in terms of reporting
obligations-accounting, securities, Sarbanes-Oxley, or otherwise.
Although the compromise of a disputed claim may be reportable
under certain circumstances, the disclosure of the compromise of a
disputed claim rarely rises to the level of a significant corporate
event with prospective and adverse consequences. Second, the
paying party is laying the foundation for the argument to exclude
the settlement agreement in any future cases.
Although a
confidential settlement agreement may be discoverable in
subsequent litigation,62 it may not be admissible at trial because it
is only evidence that the parties compromised a disputed claim
and, therefore, may not be relevant in future actions. 63
10. Choice ofLaw and Choice ofForum - Important Decisions
with Important Impact
Forum selection and choice of law provisions are presumptively
valid. 64 Although choices of law and forum generally are
considered on a state-by-state basis, if the underlying claims are
predicated on federal law, then careful consideration should be
given to whether state law will apply under any circumstance. 65
In order to ensure that courts give effect to the parties' choice of
forum, consider including mandatory terms such as '"exclusive,'''

62.

63.

64.
65.

Doe v. Mcthacton Sch. Dist., 164 FRD. 175, 176 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (recognizing
that relevant settlement agreements are discoverable); Poner Hayden Co. v.
Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 466,713 A.2d 962, 969 (1998) ("[T]he relevant portions
of ... settlement agreements are discoverable.").
E.g., FED. R. EVID. 408.
MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. I, 9 (1972); Tjontveit v. Den
Norske Bank ASA, 997 F. Supp. 799, 805 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
See Maynard v. Durham & S. Ry. Co., 365 U.S. 160 (1961) (quoting Dice v.
Akron, 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952) (stating that the validity of a release under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act presents a question of federal law, not state
law)).
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"'sole,''' and "'only.",66 A relatively typical forum selection and
choice of law provision might be the following:
Governing Law.
This Agreement shall be
governed by and construed in accordance with the
laws of the State of
without regard to
Choice of Law principles. This Agreement shall be
enforced only in a court of competent jurisdiction
and venue within the State of - - - - - The obvious advantage to this clause is convenience, assuming
forum is something the parties are willing to agree on. If a party
negotiating from a dominant position imposes an unreasonable
forum, then the choice of law clause may not be given effect where
the chosen state has no reasonable relation to the parties or the
nature of the agreement. 67 This is not to suggest, however, that it
would be inappropriate to consider how a particular state law
might construe or enforce the settlement agreement.
Although the presumptive validity of a choice of law or choice
of forum provision can be rebutted, the burden is on the party
challenging that provision. 68 Moreover, the party challenging the
provision has the burden of showing the clause is unreasonable
because (1) the provision was induced by "fraud or overreaching;"
(2) the selected forum will result in "grave inconvenience or
unfairness;" (3) the choice of law is fundamentally unfair; or (4)
enforcement contravenes "a strong public policy of the forum
state.,,69
11. Waiver ofJury Trial- The Benefit and the Burden

Although most financial services companies might prefer to
have a dispute concerning the validity of any settlement agreement
determined by the court as opposed to a jury, the careful
practitioner should take note of the legal issues inherent in
including a waiver of jury trial provision in a settlement
agreement. In Maryland, for example, it seems settled that "parties
can contractually waive their right to a jury trial.,,70 Pennsylvania
66.

67.

68.
69.
70.

Cable Tel Servs., Inc. v. Overland Contracting, Inc., 574 S.E.2d 31,34-35 (N.C.
App. 2002) (quoting Mark Group Int'l, Inc. v. Still, 566 S.E.2d 160, 162 (N.C.
App. 2002».
Robinson v. Robinson, 778 So. 2d 1I05, 1117-18 (La. 2001) (finding North
Carolina choice of law provision in settlement agreement against public policy
because one party would unfairly benefit and no significant connection was
present); Lang Tendons, Inc. v. Great Sw. Mktg. Co., No. 90-7847, 1994 WL
159014, at '"4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 1994).
Weiss v. La Suisse, Societe D'Assurances Sur La Vie, 154 F. Supp. 2d 734, 736
(S.D.N.Y.2001).
Haynsworth v. Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 963 (5th Cir. 1997).
Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 386 Md. 412,442, 872 A.2d 735, 753 (2005). See
also ST Sys. Corp. v. Md. Nat'l Bank, 112 Md. App. 20, 33-35, 684 A.2d 32, 38-
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courts likewise enforce prelitigation waivers of the right to a jury
trial. 71
In Grafton Partners L.P. v. Superior Court,72 the California
Supreme Court held that prelitigation jury trial waiver agreements
are unenforceable. 73 The Georgia Supreme Court reached the
same conclusion eleven years earlier in Bank South, NA. v.
Howard. 74
If the decision is made to include a provision waiving jury trial,
then consider including the provision in all capital letters in order
to avoid any claim that it was inconspicuous and was slipped by
both claimant and counsel. Another reason to employ capital
letters is the possibility of a reviewing court's determination that
the releasor was giving up a fundamental constitutional right. 75
Including this provision in all capitals runs the risk that claimant's
counsel may object to its inclusion, but if the provision is included
after an objection is made, then the provision unquestionably was
accepted by the claimant as part of the compromise necessary to
achieve a settlement. Although this would not overcome any
constitutional deficiency found by a reviewing court, it should
weigh heavily in favor of the released parties in any other context.
An example of language that might be appropriate for inclusion
in a settlement agreement seeking a waiver of the right to jury trial
is as follows:
Waiver ofJury Trial.
ALL PARTIES TO
THIS AGREEMENT HEREBY WAIVE TRIAL
BY JURY IN ANY ACTION, PROCEEDING,
SUIT, COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS-CLAIM, OR
THIRD-PARTY CLAIM BROUGHT BY ANY OF
THE PARTIES HERETO ON ANY MATTERS
WHATSOEVER ARISING OUT OF OR IN ANY
WAY RELATED TO OR CONNECTED WITH
THIS AGREEMENT.

71.

72.
73.
74.
75.

40 ( 1996) (waiving trial by jury for "transactions contemplated" before any
dispute or litigation arises).
Eighth N.-Val, Inc. v. Parkinson, 773 A.2d 1248, 1256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001);
Acad. Indus., Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 54 Pa. D. & C.4th 424, 427-28 (2001);
Mesne Props., Inc. v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2001 PhiIa. Ct. Com. PI. LEXIS
105, at * 14-17 (April 6, 2001).
116 P.3d 479 (Cal. 2005).
Id. at 482-88.
444 S.E.2d 799, 800 (Ga. 1994).
See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (preserving inviolate the common law right to a jury
trial for legal claims).
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Putting aside the constitutional ~uestion, this provision is
construed under basic contract law,7 and parties to a contract
generally are entitled to waive their right to a jury trial. 77 So long
as "there is clear, unambiguous waiver to a jury trial," the waiver
should be enforceable. 78
A careful practitioner including a waiver of jury trial provision
almost without exception should include a severability provision in
the settlement agreement. The reason to do so is to avoid giving a
claimant grounds to attack the entire settlement agreement based
on the alleged constitutional invalidity of one provision-waiver of
jury trial. Indeed, even if this one provision is determined to be
invalid, it seems likely that in most cases the paying party will
continue to desire judicial enforcement of the remaining settlement
terms.
12. Severability - Generally a Necessary Provision
"Whether a contract is entire or severable generally is a
question of intention, to be determined from the language
employed by the parties, viewed in the light of the circumstances
surrounding them at the time they contracted.,,79 By explicitly
stating the provisions in the settlement agreement are severable,
the financial services company has created evidence of the parties'
intentions. Indeed, a typical severability clause provides:
Severability. If any portion or portions of this
Agreement are held by a court of competent
jurisdiction to conflict with any federal, state, or
local law, and as a result such portion or portions
are declared to be invalid and of no force or effect
in such jurisdiction, all remaining portions of this
Agreement shall otherwise remain in full force and
effect and be construed as if such invalid portion or
portions had not been included herein.
76.

77.

78.

79.

E.g., Cantor Fitzgerald, Inc. v. Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., No. 00C-05-15I WCC,
2001 WL 589028, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 24, 2001).
Seaford Assocs. v. Hess Apparel, Inc., No. 92C-IO-II, 1993 WL 258723, at *2
(Del. Super. Ct. June 22, 1993). See also Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Hartstone, No. 9610 I66-NG, 1997 WL 557564, at *14 (D. Mass. May 29, 1997) (striking julY
demand by a party to a settlement agreement containing an express waiver of the
right to a julY trial).
See Seaford Assocs., 1993 WL 258723, at *2 (describing valid julY trial waiver).
Cj Bonnie-Lassie Sportswear, Inc. v. CentuIY Factors, Inc., 127 N. Y.S.2d 740,
741 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954); Browning v. Holloway, 620 S.W.2d 611, 618 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1981) (rejecting defendant's argument that language in settlement
agreement gave court fact-finding power and was therefore a waiver of right to
jury trial).
Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 856 (N.Y. 1977) (citation omitted);
Barden & Robeson Corp. v. Timmerman, 497 N.Y.S.2d 196, 197 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1986) (citation omitted).
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The District Court of Appeal of Florida found error in a lower
tribunal's decision not to apply the severability clause and set aside
the entire settlement agreement. 80 The appeals court found the
severability clause to be sufficiently broad that the solitary invalid
term could be struck, leaving the rest of the agreement effective. 8l
There are instances, however, when an entire agreement will be
deemed invalid despite a severability clause. 82 If the questionable
term is at the heart of the agreement, and striking that term would
render the rest of the areement mere "rhetoric," then the entire
agreement may be void. 8
Although the purpose of this clause is largely self-explanatory,
for some of the reasons discussed above with respect to waiver of
jury trial, the provision may become important for unanticipated
and prospective reasons. If, for example, a court holds that a
certain provision in a settlement agreement is contrary to a
particular state's public policy, then the paying party may prefer to
have the offending provision declared invalid without voiding the
entire settlement agreement.
13. Tax Consequences Provision Is Absolutely Essential
An issue that frequently arises during settlement negotiations is
the tax consequences of the payment being made as part of the
settlement. The claimant, of course, wants as much of the recovery
as possible to be non-taxable income. The paying party generally
is interested only in making clear that it has no responsibility for
reporting in a particular manner or paying any taxes due. An
example of such a clause is as follows:
Tax Consequences. The undersigned parties
acknowledge that no party to this Agreement has
made representations concerning, nor shall any
party be responsible in any manner for, any income
tax consequences to any other party arising out of
this Agreement and/or the above-mentioned
consideration. Any tax liability of Releasor to any
federal, state, or local taxing authority shall be
Releasor's exclusive responsibility. Releasor agrees
to make no claim against the Releasing Party
regarding the reporting, if any, to taxing authorities
of any payment made pursuant to this Agreement or
for the payment or reimbursement of any tax
80.

81.
82.
83.

Brevard County Bd. Of Comm'rs v. Williams, 715 So. 2d 1100, 1102 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1998).
Id.
In re U.S. Brass Corp., 277 B.R. 326, 329-30 (E.D. Tex. 2002).
!d. at 33\-32.
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consequences resulting to Releasor as a result of
any payment made pursuant to this Agreement.
This is not to say that settlement agreements are written without
consideration of the tax implications. Indeed, certain contract and
tort personal injury damages and consequential damages arising
from these claims may be excludable from income for tax
purposes. 84 In determining whether the income is excludable,
generally speaking, the "express language in a settlement
agreement is the most important factor," but a court is not "bound
by express allocations in a written settlement agreement if the
parties did not engage in bona fide, arm's-length adversarial
negotiations.,,85
This is particularly true when the correct
allocation can be determined from other evidence, which reveals
that the payment represented something other than that stated in
the agreement. 86
If the financial services company is asked to consider allocating
payment in a manner intended to receive favorable tax treatment
for the plaintiff, then the financial services company might
consider asking for similar favorable terms. If plaintiff wants to
allocate the settlement amount to a particular claim in order to seek
favorable tax treatment, then the financial services company
should consider asking plaintiff to acknowledge that any and all
other claims, for which settlement payment might be considered
for tax purposes, have no merit, or at the very least are factually
and legally deficient. Even if the financial services company
agrees to some sort of allocation language in the settlement
agreement, however, it still should insist on a provision providing
that no tax consequence is assured or in any way relevant to the
validity of the settlement agreement.
14. Further Assurances Provision Is Often Worth Including

A further assurances provision can be particularly appropriate in
the context of financial instruments. Either party may need the
assistance of the other in connection with tax or record-keeping
issues.
For this reason, and to avoid unreasonable and
84.

85.
86.

26 U.S.C.A. § 104(a)(2) (West 2002); see also Lane v. United States, 902 F.
Supp. 1439, 1443 (W.O. Okla. 1995) (acknowledging certain insurance "contract
damages are excludable from income"). But see Comm'r v. Schleier, SIS U.S.
323, 327 (1995) (finding that amounts received in settlement for Age
Discrimination in Employment Act claim did not fall within exclusion from gross
income as damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness). "When
the settlement agreement allocates clearly the settlement proceeds, . . . the
allocation is generally binding for tax purposes ...." Robinson v. Comm'r, 102
T.C. 116, 127 (1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 70 F.3d 34,39 (5th Cir. 1995).
McKay v. Comm'r, 102 T.C. 465, 482 (1994), vacated, 84 F.3d 433 (5th Cir.
1996).
Millenbach v. Comm'r, 318 F.3d 924, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2003).
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unprincipled refusals to cooperate absent a payment in tribute,
consider including a further assurance provision, such as:
Further Assurances. The parties agree to execute
such further and additional documents, instruments,
and writings as may be necessary, proper, required,
desirable, or convenient for the purpose of fully
effectuating the terms and provisions of this
Agreement.
15. Consider Inclusion of Provision Regarding Attorneys' Fees
Including a provision for the payment of attorneys' fees in the
event of a breach of a settlement agreement can be a contentious
issue, particularly if the provision is unilateral. For this reason, if
such a provision is desired, it makes sense to propose a mutual
provision, meaning either party could recover attorneys' fees if
there is a breach of the agreement. From the perspective of the
payor party, such a provision often is viewed favorably because it
helps to discourage frivolous challenges to the validity of the
settlement agreement.
CONCLUSION

This article is not intended to anticipate every possible adverse
consequence arising from settlement agreements, or to suggest that
all future litigation concerning settlement agreements is avoidable.
Rather, the point is that careful negotiation and drafting should
avoid many future disputes and should keep most matters forever
resolved. From a transactional viewpoint, it is cost effective to
negotiate a carefully crafted and definitive settlement agreement.
Even if only one lawsuit is avoided or summarily dismissed, then
the settlement agreement's effectiveness is affirmed. In addition,
by consistently employing a thorough and complete agreement, the
vast majority of agreements will go unchallenged. Mounting a
collateral attack on a carefully crafted and definitive settlement
agreement is difficult and will impose high barriers to any potential
challenger. In the small fraction of cases where a challenge is
made, the court likely will be in a position to summarily dispose of
the matter without permitting discovery or admitting any extrinsic
evidence.

